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Abstract
We show that the problem of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous
game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter  is
exponentially small in the number of players.
1 Introduction
The celebrated theorem of Nash [Nas50, Nas51] states that every game has an equilibrium point.
The concept of Nash equilibrium has been tremendously influential in economics and social sciences
ever since (e.g., see [HR04]), and its computation has been one the most well-studied problems in
the area of Algorithmic Game Theory. For normal form games with a bounded number of players,
much progress has been made during the past decade in understanding both the complexity of Nash
equilibrium [AKV05,CDT06,CTV07,DGP09,CDT09,Meh14] as well as its efficient approximation
[LMM04,BVV05,KPS06,DMP06,DMP07,BBM07,KT07,TS07,FNS07,KS07,ABOV07,TS10].
In this paper we study a large and important class of succinct multiplayer games called anony-
mous games (see [Sch73,Mil96,Blo99,Blo05,Kal05] for studies of such games in the economics liter-
ature). These are special multiplayer games in that the payoff of each player depends only on (1) the
pure strategy of the player herself, and (2) the number of other players playing each pure strategy,
instead of the full pure strategy profile. In such a game, the (expected) payoff of a player is highly
symmetric over (pure or mixed) strategies of other players. For instance, two players switching their
strategies would not affect the payoff of any other player. A consequence of this very special payoff
structure is that O(αnα−1) numbers suffice to completely describe the payoff function of a player,
when there are α pure strategies shared by n players. Notably this is polynomial in the number of
players when α is bounded, and hence the game is succinctly representable. Throughout the paper,
we focus on succinct anonymous games with a bounded number of pure strategies.
Other well-studied multiplayer games with a succinct representation include graphical, symme-
tric, and congestion games (for more details see [PR08]). While graphical and congestion games are
both known to be hard to solve [FPT04,ARV08,SV08], there is indeed a polynomial-time algorithm
for computing an exact Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game [PR08]. Because anonymous games
generalize symmetric games by allowing player-dependent payoff functions, it is a natural question
to ask whether there is an efficient algorithm for finding an (exact or approximate) Nash equilibrium
in an anonymous game as well.
Culminating in a sequence of beautiful papers [DP07,Das08,DP08,DP09,DP14] Daskalakis and
Papadimitriou obtained a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for -approximate Nash
equilibria in anonymous games with a bounded number of strategies (see more discussion on related
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work in Section 1.1). However, the complexity of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in such games
remains open, and was conjectured to be hard for PPAD in [DP09,DP14]. 1
In this paper we give an affirmative answer to the conjecture of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou,
by showing that it is PPAD-complete to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous
game, when the approximation parameter  is exponentially small in n. To formally state our main
result, let (α, c)-Anonymous denote the problem of finding a (2−nc)-approximate Nash equilibrium
in an anonymous game with α pure strategies and payoffs from [0, 1]. 2
Here is our main theorem:
Theorem 1. For any α ≥ 7 and c > 0, the problem (α, c)-Anonymous is PPAD-complete.
The greatest challenge to establishing the PPAD-completeness result stated above is posed by the
rather complex but also highly symmetric payoff structure of anonymous games. Before discussing
our approach and techniques in Section 1.3, we first review related work in Section 1.1, then define
anonymous games formally and introduce some useful notation in Section 1.2.
1.1 Related Work
Anonymous games have been studied extensively in the economics literature [Sch73,Ras83,Mil96,
Blo99,Blo05,Kal05,ES05], where the game being considered is usually nonatomic and consists of a
continuum of players but a finite number of strategies. For the discrete setting, two special families
of anonymous games are symmetric games [PR08, BFH09] and congestion games [Ros73]. [PR08]
gave a polynomial-time for finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game. For congestion
games, PLS-completeness of pure equilibria was established in [FPT04,ARV08,SV08]3, and efficient
approximation algorithms for various latency functions were obtained in [CFGS11,CFGS12,CS11].
While an anonymous game does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium in general, it was shown
in [DP07,AS11,DP14] that when the payoff functions are λ-Lipschitz, there exists an -approximate
pure Nash equilibrium and it can be found in polynomial time, where  has a linear dependency on
λ. Furthermore, in [Bab13] Babichenko presented a best-reply dynamic for λ-Lipschitz anonymous
games with two strategies which reaches an approximate pure equilibrium in O(n log n) steps.
Regarding our specific point of interest, i.e., (mixed) Nash equilibria in anonymous games with
a scaling number of players but a non-scaling number of strategies, there have been a sequence of
positive and negative results obtained by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [DP07,DP08,Das08,DP09]
(summarized in the journal version [DP14]). We briefly review these results below.
In [DP07], Daskalakis and Papadimitriou presented a PTAS for finding an -approximate Nash
equilibrium in an anonymous game with two pure strategies, with running time nO(1/
2) ·U , where
U denotes the number of bits required to describe the payoffs. The running time was subsequently
improved in [Das08] to poly(n) · (1/)O(1/2) ·U . The first PTAS in [DP07] is based on the existence
of an -approximate Nash equilibrium consisting of integer multiples of 2, while the second PTAS
in [Das08] is based on the existence of an -approximate Nash equilibrium satisfying the following
1When the number of pure strategies is a sufficiently large constant, an anonymous game with rational payoffs may
not have any rational equilibrium (e.g., by embedding in it a rational three-player game with no rational equilibrium).
But for the case of two strategies, it remains unclear as whether every rational anonymous game has a rational Nash
equilibrium, which was posed as an open problem in [DP14].
2Since we are interested in the additive approximation, all payoffs are normalized to take values in [0, 1].
3These PLS-hardness results have no implication to the setup of this paper since the number of pure strategies in
the congestion games considered there are unbounded.
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special property: either at most O(1/3) players play mixed strategies, or all players who mix play
the same mixed strategy. Later [DP08] extended the result of [DP07], giving the only known PTAS
for anonymous games with any bounded number of pure strategies with time ng(α,1/) ·U for some
function g of α, number of pure strategies, and 1/.
All three PTAS obtained in [DP07,Das08,DP08] are so-called oblivious algorithms [DP09], i.e.,
algorithms that enumerate a set of mixed strategy profiles that is independent of the input game as
candidates for approximate Nash equilibria (hence, the game is used only to verify if a given mixed
strategy profile is an -approximate Nash equilibrium). In [DP09], Daskalakis and Papadimitriou
showed that any oblivious algorithm for anonymous games must have running time exponential in
1/. In contrast to this negative result, they also presented a non-oblivious PTAS for two-strategy
anonymous games with running time poly(n) · (1/)O(log2(1/)) · U .
1.2 Anonymous Games and Polymatrix Games
Before giving a high-level description of our approach and techniques in Section 1.3, we first give a
formal definition of anonymous games and introduce some useful notation. Consider a multiplayer
game with n players [n] = {1, . . . , n} and α pure strategies [α] = {1, . . . , α} with α being a constant.
For each pure strategy b ∈ [α], let ψb(t) denote the number of b’s in a tuple t ∈ [α]n−1, and define
Ψ(t) = (ψ1(t), . . . , ψα(t)), which we will refer to as the histogram of pure strategies in t.
In an anonymous game, the payoff of each player p ∈ [n] depends only on Ψ(s−p) and her own
strategy sp, given a pure strategy profile s ∈ [α]n. (We follow the convention and use s−p ∈ [α]n−1
to denote the pure strategy profile of the n−1 players other than player p in s.) Informally, Ψ(s−p)
can be described as what player p “sees” in the game when s is played.
We now formally define anonymous games.
Definition 2. An anonymous game G = (n, α, {payoffp}) consists of a set [n] of n players, a set [α]
of α pure strategies, and a payoff function payoffp : [α]×K → R for each player p ∈ [n], where
K =
{
(k1, . . . , kα) : kj ∈ Z≥0 for all j and
∑α
j=1 kj = n− 1
}
is the set of all histograms of pure strategies played by n− 1 players. Specifically, when s ∈ [α]n is
played, the payoff of player p is given by payoffp(sp,Ψ(s−p)).
As usual, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution x = (x1, . . . , xα), and a mixed strategy
profile X is an ordered tuple of n mixed strategies (xp : p ∈ [n]), one for each player p. Given X , let
up(b,X ) denote the expected payoff of p playing b ∈ [α], which has the following explicit expression:
up(b,X ) =
∑
k∈K
payoffp(b,k) · PrX [p,k],
where PrX [p,k] denotes the probability of player p seeing histogram k under X :
PrX [p,k] =
∑
s−p∈Ψ−1(k)
∏
q 6=p
xq,sq
 .
Note that sq denotes the pure strategy of player q from a profile s−p ∈ Ψ−1(k). We also use up(X )
to denote the expected payoff of player p from playing xp:
up(X ) =
∑
b∈[α]
xp,b · up(b,X ).
3
It is worth pointing out that, while up(b,X ) contains exponentially many terms, it can be computed
in polynomial time using dynamic programming [DP07,DP14] when α is a constant. For a detailed
presentation of the algorithm for 2-strategy anonymous games, see [DP14]. This then implies that
checking whether a given profile X is a (approximate) Nash equilibrium is in polynomial time.
Next we define (approximate) Nash equilibria of an anonymous game.
Definition 3. Given an anonymous game G = (n, α, {payoffp}), we say a mixed strategy profile X
is a Nash equilibrium of G if up(X ) ≥ up(b,X ) for all players p ∈ [n] and strategies b ∈ [α].
For  ≥ 0, we say X is an -approximate Nash equilibrium if up(X )+ ≥ up(b,X ) for all p ∈ [n]
and b ∈ [α]. For  ≥ 0, we say X is an -well-supported Nash equilibrium if up(a,X )+ < up(b,X )
implies that xp,a = 0, for all p ∈ [n] and a, b ∈ [α].
As discussed in Section 1.3, the hardness part of Theorem 1 is proved using a polynomial-time
reduction from the problem of finding a well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game (e.g.
see [CD11]). For our purposes, such a game (with n players and two strategies each player) can be
described by a payoff matrix A ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n with Ak,` = 0 for all k, ` ∈ {2i− 1, 2i} and i ∈ [n].
Each player i ∈ [n] has two pure strategies that correspond to rows 2i− 1 and 2i of A. Let Aj
denote the jth row of A. Given a vector y ∈ R2n≥0, where (y2i−1, y2i) is the mixed strategy of player
i, expected payoffs of player i for playing rows 2i− 1 and 2i are A2i−1 · y and A2i · y respectively.
An -well-supported Nash equilibrium of A is a vector y ∈ R2n≥0 such that y2i−1 + y2i = 1 and
A2i−1 · y > A2i · y +  ⇒ y2i = 0 and A2i · y > A2i−1 · y +  ⇒ y2i−1 = 0,
for all players i ∈ [n]. We need the following result on such games:
Theorem 4 ([CPY13]). The problem of computing a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in a
polymatrix game is PPAD-complete.
1.3 Our Approach and Techniques
A commonly used approach to establishing the PPAD-hardness of approximate equilibria is to de-
sign gadget games that can perform certain arithmetic operations on entries of mixed strategies of
players (e.g. see [DGP09,CDT09]). Such gadgets would then yield a reduction from the problem of
solving a generalized circuit [DGP09,CDT09], a problem complete in PPAD. However, we realized
that this approach may not work well with anonymous games; we found that it was impossible to
design an anonymous game G= that enforces equality constraints.
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Instead we show the PPAD-hardness of anonymous games via a reduction from the problem of
finding a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium in a two-strategy polymatrix game (see Section 1.2).
Given a 2n × 2n polymatrix game A, our reduction constructs an anonymous game GA with n
“main” players {P1, . . . , Pn} (and two auxiliary players). We have each main player Pi simulate in
a way a player i in the polymatrix game, as discussed below, such that any -well-supported Nash
equilibrium of GA with an exponentially small  can be used to recover a (1/n)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of the polymatrix game A efficiently. We then prove a connection between
approximate Nash equilibria and well-supported Nash equilibria of anonymous games to finish the
proof of Theorem 1.
4For example, we can rule out the existence of an anonymous game G= with 4 players and 2 pure strategies such
that x is a Nash equilibrium of G= if and only if x1 = x2 ∈ [µ, ν] ⊆ [0, 1] and x3 = x4 ∈ [µ′, ν′] ⊆ [0, 1], where we use
xi to denote the probability that player i plays the first pure strategy.
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The greatest challenge to establishing such a reduction is posed by the complex but highly struc-
tured, symmetric expression of expected payoffs in an anonymous game. As discussed previously in
Section 1.2, the expected payoff up(b,X ) of player p is a linear form of probabilities PrX [p,k], each
of which is function over mixed strategies of all players other than p. This rather complex func-
tion makes it difficult to reason about the set of well-supported Nash equilibria of an anonymous
game, not to mention our goal is to embed a polymatrix game in it. To overcome this obstacle, we
need to find a special (but hard enough) family of anonymous games with certain payoff structures
which allow us to perform a careful analysis and understand their well-supported equilibria. The
bigger obstacle for our reduction, however, is to in some sense remove the anonymity of the players
and break the inherent symmetry underlying an anonymous game.
To see this, a natural approach to obtain a reduction from polymatrix games is to directly encode
the 2n variables of y in mixed strategies of the n “main” players {P1, . . . , Pn}. More specifically,
let {s1, s2} denote two special pure strategies of GA, and we attempt to encode (y2i−1, y2i) in
(xi,s1 , xi,s2), probabilities of Pi playing s1, s2, respectively. The reduction would work if expected
payoffs of Pi from s1 and s2 in GA can always match closely expected payoffs of player i from rows
2i−1 and 2i in A, given by two linear forms A2i−1 ·y and A2i ·y of y. However, it seems difficult, if
not impossible, to construct GA with this property, since anonymous games are highly symmetric:
the expected payoff of Pi is a symmetric function over mixed strategies of all other players. This is
not the case for polymatrix games: a linear form such as A2i ·y in general has different coefficients
for different variables, so different players contribute with different weights to the expected payoff
of a player (and the problem of finding a well-supported equilibrium in A clearly becomes trivial if
we require that every row of A has the same entry).
An alternative approach is to encode the 2n variables of y in probabilities PrX [p,k]. This may
look appealing because expected payoffs up(b,X ) are linear forms of these probabilities so one can
set the coefficients payoffp(b,k) to match them easily with those linear forms Aj · y that appear in
the polymatrix game A. However, the histogram k seen by a player p (as a vector-valued random
variable) is the sum of n−1 vector-valued random variables, each distributed according to the mixed
strategy of a player other than p. The way these probabilities PrX [p,k] are derived in turn imposes
strong restrictions on them,5 which makes it a difficult task to obtain a correspondence between
the 2n free variables in y and the probabilities PrX [p,k].
Our reduction indeed follows the first approach of encoding (y2i−1, y2i) in (xi,s1 , xi,s2) of player
Pi. More exactly, the former is the normalization of the latter into a probability distribution. Now
to overcome the difficulty posed by symmetry, we enforce the following “scaling” property in every
well-supported Nash equilibrium X of GA: probabilities of Pi playing {s1, s2} satisfy
xi,s1 + xi,s2 ≈ 1/N i, (1)
where N is exponentially large in n. This property is established by designing an anonymous
game called generalized radix game G∗n,N , and then using it as the base game in the construction
of GA. We show that (1) holds approximately for every anonymous game that is payoff-wise close
to G∗n,N . In particular, (1) holds for any well-supported equilibrium of GA, as long as we make sure
GA is close to G∗n,N . The “scaling” property plays a crucial role in our reduction because, as the
base game for GA, it helps us reason about well-supported Nash equilibria of GA; it also removes
5For example, as it is pointed out in [DP07, DP08] for anonymous games with two strategies, players can always
be partitioned into a few sets such that the probabilities PrX [p,k] over k must follow approximately a Poisson or a
discretized Normal distribution on each set respectively.
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anonymity of the n “main” players Pi (since they must play the two special pure strategies {s1, s2}
with probabilities of different scales) and overcome the symmetry barrier.
Equipped with the “scaling” property (1), we prove a key technical lemma called the estimation
lemma. It shows that one can compute efficiently coefficients of a linear form over probabilities of
histograms PrX [Pi,k] seen by player Pi, which guarantees to approximate additively xj,s1 (or xj,s2)
i.e. probability of another player Pj plays s1 (or s2), whenever the profile X satisfies the “scaling”
property (this holds when GA is close to G∗n,N and X is a well-supported equilibrium of GA). As
(y2j−1, y2j) ≈ N j(xj,s1 , xj,s2)
given (1), these linear forms for xj,s1 , xj,s2 can be combined to derive a linear form of PrX [Pi,k] to
approximate additively any linear form of y, particularly A2i−1 ·y or A2i ·y that appear as expected
payoffs of player i in the polymatrix game A. The proof of the estimation lemma is the technically
most involved part of the paper. We indeed derive explicit expressions for coefficients of the desired
linear form where substantial cancellations yield an additive approximation of xj,s1 or xj,s2 .
Finally we combine all ingredients highlighted above to construct an anonymous game GA from
polymatrix game A. This is done by first using the estimation lemma to compute, for each main Pi
coefficients of linear forms of probabilities PrX [Pi,k] seen by Pi that yield additive approximations
of xj,s1 and xj,s2 . We then perturb payoff functions of players Pi in the generalized radix game
G∗n,N using these coefficients so that 1) the resulting game GA is close to G∗n,N and thus, any well-
supported equilibrium X of GA automatically satisfies the “scaling” property; 2) expected payoffs
of Pi playing s1, s2 in a well-supported equilibrium X of GA match additively expected payoffs of
player i playing rows 2i− 1, 2i in A, given y derived from X by normalizing (xj,s1 , xj,s2) for each j.
The correctness of the reduction, i.e., y is a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A whenever X is
an -well-supported equilibrium of GA with an exponentially small , follows from these properties
of GA.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we define the radix game, and show that it has a unique Nash equilibrium as a warm-
up. We also use it to define the generalized radix game which serves as the base of our reduction. In
section 3, we characterize well-supported Nash equilibria of anonymous games that are close to the
generalized radix game (i.e., those that can be obtained by adding small perturbations to payoffs of
the generalized radix game). In section 4, we prove the PPAD-hardness part of the main theorem.
Our reduction relies on a crucial technical lemma, called the estimation lemma, which we prove in
Section 5. We prove the membership in Section 6, and conclude with open problems in Section 7.
2 Warm-up: Radix Game
In this section, we first define a (n+ 2)-player anonymous game Gn,N , called the radix game. As a
warmup for the next section, we show that it has a unique Nash equilibrium. We then use the radix
game to define the generalized radix game G∗n,N , by making a duplicate of a pure strategy in Gn,N .
The latter will serve as the base game for our polynomial-time reduction from polymatrix games.
6
2.1 Radix Game
The radix game Gn,N to be defined has a unique Nash equilibrium of a specific form: given N ≥ 2
as an integer parameter of the game, each of the n “main” players mixes over the first two strategies
with probabilities 1/N i and 1−1/N i, respectively, for each i ∈ [n], in the unique Nash equilibrium.
The remaining two “special” players are created to achieve the aforementioned property.
Game 1 (Radix Game Gn,N ). Let n ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2 denote two integer parameters. Let δ = 1/N .
Let Gn,N denote the following anonymous game with n+2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R} and 6 pure
strategies {s, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. We refer to {P1, . . . , Pn} as the main players. Each main player Pi
is only interested in strategies s and t (e.g., by setting her payoff of playing any other four actions
to be −1 no matter what other players play). Player Q is only interested in strategies {q1, q2}, and
player R is only interested in strategies {r1, r2}.
Next we define the payoff function of each player. When describing the payoff of a player below
we always use k = (ks, kt, kq1 , kq2 , kr1 , kr2) to denote the histogram of strategies this player sees.
1. For each i ∈ [n], the payoff of player Pi when she plays s only depends on ks:
payoffPi(s,k) =
 δ
i +
∏
j∈[n] δ
j if ks = n− 1∏
j∈[n] δ
j otherwise.
The payoff of player Pi when she plays t only depends on kr1:
payoffPi(t,k) =
{
2 if kr1 = 1
0 otherwise.
2. The payoff of player Q when she plays q1 or q2 is given by
payoffQ(q1,k) =
{
1 if ks = n
0 otherwise
and payoffQ(q2,k) =
{
1 if kr1 = 1
0 otherwise.
3. The payoff of player R when she plays r1 or r2 is given by
payoffR(r1,k) =
{
1 if kq1 = 1
0 otherwise
and payoffR(r2,k) =
{
1 if kq2 = 1
0 otherwise.
This finishes the definition of the radix game Gn,N .
Fact 5. Gn,N is an anonymous game with payoff functions taking values from [−1, 2].
Since the main players Pi are only interested in {s, t}, Q is only interested in {q1, q2}, and R is
only interested in {r1, r2}, each Nash equilibrium X of Gn,N can be fully specified by a (n+2)-tuple
X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) ∈ [0, 1]n+2, where xi denotes the probability of Pi playing strategy s for each
i ∈ [n], y denotes the probability of Q playing q1, and z denotes the probability of R playing r1.
Given X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) we calculate the expected payoff of each player as follows (we skip
X in the expected payoffs up(b,X ), when X is clear from the context, and we use ui to denote the
expected payoff of Pi instead of uPi for convenience):
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Fact 6. Given X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z), the expected payoff of player Pi for playing s is
ui(s) = δ
i · Pr[ks = n− 1]+ ∏
j∈[n]
δj = δi
∏
j 6=i∈[n]
xj +
∏
j∈[n]
δj .
The expected payoff of Pi for playing t is ui(t) = 2z.
The expected payoff of player Q for playing q1 is
uQ(q1) = Pr
[
ks = n
]
=
∏
i∈[n]
xi.
The expected payoff of Q for playing q2 is uQ(q2) = z.
The expected payoff of R for playing r1 is uR(r1) = y and that for r2 is uR(r2) = 1− y.
We show that xi = δ
i in a Nash equilibrium X of Gn,N . We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 7. In a Nash equilibrium X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) of Gn,N , we have that z =
∏
i∈[n] xi.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that z >
∏
i xi. As uQ(q2) > uQ(q1) and X is a Nash equilibrium,
player Q never plays q1 and thus, y = 0. This in turn implies uR(r2) = 1 > 0 = uR(r1) and z = 0,
which contradicts with the assumption that z >
∏
i xi ≥ 0.
Next, assume for contradiction that z <
∏
i xi, giving us that uQ(q2) < uQ(q1). Player Q never
plays q2 and y = 1. This implies that uR(r1) > uR(r2) and thus z = 1, which contradicts with the
assumption that z <
∏
i xi ≤ 1 (as xi ∈ [0, 1]). This finishes the proof of the lemma.
We now show that the radix game Gn,N has a unique Nash equilibrium X with xi = δi.
Lemma 8. In a Nash equilibrium X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) of Gn,N , we have xi = δi for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. First we show that
∏
i∈[n] xi =
∏
i∈[n] δ
i. Consider for contradiction the following two cases:
Case 1:
∏
i∈[n] xi <
∏
i∈[n] δ
i. Then there is an i ∈ [n] such that xi < δi. For Pi, we have
ui(s) = δ
i
∏
j 6=i
xj +
∏
j∈[n]
δj >
∏
j∈[n]
xj +
∏
j∈[n]
xj = 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj = 2z = ui(t). (2)
This implies that xi = 1, contradicting with the assumption that xi < δ
i < 1 as N ≥ 2.
Case 2:
∏
i∈[n] xi >
∏
i∈[n] δ
i. Then there is an i ∈ [n] such that xi > δi. For Pi, we have
ui(s) = δ
i
∏
j 6=i
xj +
∏
j∈[n]
δj <
∏
j∈[n]
xj +
∏
j∈[n]
xj = 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj = 2z = ui(t). (3)
This implies that xi = 0, contradicting with the assumption that xi > δ
i > 0.
As a result, we must have
∏
i xi =
∏
i δ
i, which also implies that xi > 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Now we show that xi = δ
i for all i. Assume for contradiction that xi 6= δi for some i ∈ [n].
Case 1: xi < δ
i. Then the same strict inequality (2) holds for Pi, which implies that
xi = 1, contradicting with the assumption that xi < δ
i < 1 as N ≥ 2.
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Case 2: xi > δ
i. Then the same strict inequality (3) holds for Pi, which implies that
xi = 0, contradicting with the assumption that xi > δ
i > 0.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Notice that Lemma 7 and 8 together imply that Gn,N has a unique Nash equilibrium because of
Lemma 7 as well as the fact that 0 < z < 1 implies uR(r1) = y = 1− y = uR(r2) and thus y = 1/2.
2.2 Generalized Radix Game
We use Gn,N to define an anonymous game G∗n,N , called the generalized radix game, with the same
set of n+ 2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R} but seven strategies {s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. To this end, we
replace strategy s in Gn,N with two of its duplicate strategies s1, s2 in G∗n,N and make sure that the
players in G∗n,N treat both s1 and s2 the same as the old strategy s, and have their payoff functions
derived from those of players in Gn,N in this fashion. We will show in the next section that in any
Nash equilibrium of G∗n,N , player Pi must have probability exactly δi distributed among s1, s2.
For readers who are familiar with previous PPAD-hardness results of Nash equilibria in normal
form games [DGP09,CDT09], this is the same trick used to derive the game generalized matching
pennies from matching pennies. We define G∗n,N formally as follows.
Game 2 (Generalized Radix Game G∗n,N ). Let n ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2 be two parameters. Let δ = 1/N .
We use G∗n,N to denote an anonymous game with the same n+ 2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R} as Gn,N
but now 7 pure strategies {s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. The payoff function payoff∗T of a player T in G∗n.N
is defined using payoffT of the same player T in Gn,N as follows:
payoff∗T
(
b,
(
ks1 , ks2 , kt, kq1 , kq2 , kr1 , kr2
))
= payoffT
(
φ(b),
(
ks1 + ks2 , kt, kq1 , kq2 , kr1 , kr2
))
,
where φ(s1) = φ(s2) = s and φ(b) = b for every other pure strategy.
Since the payoff of player Pi is always −1 when playing q1, q2, r1 or r2, she is only interested in
s1, s2 and t. Similarly Q is only interested in q1, q2 and R is only interested in r1, r2. As a result, a
Nash equilibrium X of G∗n,N can be fully specified by 2n+ 2 numbers (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]), where
xi,1 (or xi,2) denotes the probability of Pi playing strategy s1 (or strategy s2, respectively), so the
probability of Pi playing t is 1− xi,1 − xi,2. We also let xi = xi,1 + xi,2 for each i ∈ [n].
Given the definition of G∗n,N from Gn,N , Lemma 8 suggests xi = xi,1 + xi,2 = δi, for all i ∈ [n],
in every Nash equilibrium X of G∗n,N . This indeed follows from the main lemma of the next section
concerning -well-supported Nash equilibria of not only the generalized radix game G∗n,N itself, but
also anonymous games obtained by perturbing payoff functions of G∗n,N .
3 Generalized Radix Game after Perturbation
In this section, we analyze -well-supported Nash equilibria of anonymous games obtained by per-
turbing payoff functions of the generalized radix game G∗n,N . Recall that n ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2, and we
use payoff∗T to denote the payoff function of a player T in G∗n,N . Given x, y ∈ R and ξ ≥ 0, we write
x = y ± ξ to denote |x− y| ≤ ξ. We first define anonymous games that are close to G∗n,N .
Definition 9. For ξ ≥ 0, we say an anonymous game G is ξ-close to G∗n,N if
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1. G has the same set {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R} of players and same set of 7 strategies as G∗n,N .
2. For each player T ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R}, her payoff function payoffT in G satisfies
payoffT (b,k) = payoff
∗
T (b,k)± ξ,
for all b ∈ {s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2} and all histograms k of strategies played by n+ 1 players.
To characterize -well-supported Nash equilibria of a game G ξ-close to G∗n,N we first show that
when , ξ are small enough, each player in G remains only interested in a subset of strategies, i.e.,
{s1, s2, t} for Pi, {q1, q2} for Q, and {r1, r2} for R, in any -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G.
Lemma 10. Let G be an anonymous game ξ-close to G∗n,N for some ξ ≥ 0. When 2ξ+  < 1, every
-well-supported Nash equilibrium of G satisfies: player Pi only plays {s1, s2, t}; player Q only plays
{q1, q2}; player R only plays {r1, r2}.
Proof. We only prove (1) since the proof of (2) and (3) is similar.
Given an -well-supported Nash equilibrium X , as the payoff of Pi when playing b /∈ {s1, s2, t}
is always −1 in G∗n,N , her expected payoff when playing b in G is at most −1 + ξ; as the payoff of Pi
when playing b ∈ {s1, s2, t} is always nonnegative in G∗n,N , her expected payoff in G is at least −ξ.
It follows from 2ξ +  < 1 and the assumption of X being an -well-supported equilibrium that Pi
only plays strategies in {s1, s2, t} with positive probability.
It follows from Lemma 10 that an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G can be fully described
by a tuple of 2n+ 2 numbers (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]), when ξ,  satisfy 2ξ +  < 1: xi,1 denotes the
probability of Pi playing s1, xi,2 denotes the probability of Pi playing s2, y denotes the probability
of Q playing q1, and z denotes the probability of R playing r1.
Recall that δ = 1/N ≤ 1/2. Let κ = ∏i∈[n] δi. We prove the main lemma of this section.
Lemma 11. Let G denote an anonymous game that is ξ-close to G∗n,N . Suppose that ξ,  ≥ 0 satisfy
τ =
36ξ + 18
κ
≤ 1/2. (4)
Then every -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G satisfies xi,1 + xi,2 = δi ± τδi for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. Let X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) be an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G. For each i ∈
[n] we let xi = xi,1 + xi,2. Since G is ξ-close to G∗n,N , we have the following estimates:
1. The expected payoff of Pi for playing strategy s1 or s2 is
ui(s1), ui(s2) =
(
δi · Pr[ks1 + ks2 = n− 1]+∏j∈[n] δj)± ξ = (δi∏j 6=i xj + κ)± ξ,
where we write ks1 , ks2 to denote the numbers of players that play s1, s2 respectively, as seen
by player Pi (same below). The expected payoff of Pi for playing t is ui(t) = 2z ± ξ.
2. The expected payoff of Q for playing q1 is
uQ(q1) = Pr
[
ks1 + ks2 = n
]± ξ = ∏j∈[n] xj ± ξ.
The expected payoff of Q for playing q2 is uQ(q2) = z ± ξ.
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3. The expected payoff of R for playing r1 is uR(r1) = y ± ξ and for r2 is uR(r2) = (1− y)± ξ.
To rest of the proof follows those of Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. First we show that z must satisfy
z =
∏
j∈[n]
xj ± (2ξ + ). (5)
The proof is the same as that of Lemma 7, using the assumption that X is -well-supported.
Given (5), next we show that the xi’s satisfy∏
i∈[n]
xi =
∏
i∈[n]
δi ± (6ξ + 3) = κ± (6ξ + 3). (6)
To this end we follow the proof of the first part of Lemma 8 and consider the following two cases:
Case 1:
∏
i∈[n] xi < κ− (6ξ + 3). Then there exists an i ∈ [n] such that xi < δi. For Pi:
ui(s1) ≥ δi
∏
j 6=i
xj + κ− ξ > 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj + 5ξ + 3 and ui(t) ≤ 2z + ξ ≤ 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj + 5ξ + 2.
This implies that Pi does not play t in X , an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G, and
thus, xi = xi,1 + xi,2 = 1, contradicting with xi < δ
i < 1 as N ≥ 2.
Case 2:
∏
i∈[n] xi > κ+ (6ξ + 3). Then there exists an i ∈ [n] such that xi > δi. For Pi:
ui(s1), ui(s2) ≤ δi
∏
j 6=i
xj + κ+ ξ < 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj − 5ξ − 3 and ui(t) ≥ 2
∏
j∈[n]
xj − 5ξ − 2.
This implies that Pi plays neither s1 nor s2 and thus, we have xi,1 = xi,2 = 0 and xi = 0 as
well, contradicting with xi > δ
i > 0.
By (5) and (6), z = κ± (8ξ+ 4). (6) also implies that xi > 0 since κ > 0 and κ ≥ 72ξ+ 36 by (4).
Finally, assume for contradiction that either xi < (1− τ)δi or xi > (1 + τ)δi for some i ∈ [n].
Case 1: xi < (1− τ)δi. Then using τ ≤ 1/2 and 1 ≤ 1/(1− τ) ≤ 2, we have
ui(s1)− ui(t) ≥ δi
∏
j 6=i
xj + κ− 2z − 2ξ > κ− 6ξ − 3
1− τ + κ− 2z − 2ξ ≥ τκ− 30ξ − 14.
Plugging in the definition of τ in (4), we have ui(s1)− ui(t) >  and thus, xi = 1, which
contradicts with the assumption that xi < (1− τ)δi < 1.
Case 2: xi > (1 + τ)δ
i. Then using τ ≤ 1/2 and 2/3 ≤ 1/(1 + τ) ≤ 1, we have
ui(s1)− ui(t) ≤ δi
∏
j 6=i
xj + κ− 2z + 2ξ < κ+ 6ξ + 3
1 + τ
+ κ− 2z + 2ξ ≤ −2τκ
3
+ 24ξ + 11.
The same inequality holds for ui(s2)− ui(t). Plugging in (4), we have ui(s1)− ui(t) < − as
well as ui(s2)− ui(t) < −. This in turn implies that xi,1 = xi,2 = 0 and thus, xi = 0, which
contradicts with the assumption that xi > (1 + τ)δ
i > 0.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
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4 Reduction from Polymatrix Games to Anonymous Games
In this section we prove the hardness part of Theorem 1. For this purpose we present a polynomial
time reduction from the problem of finding a 1/n-well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix
game to the problem of finding an -well-supported Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with
7 strategies, for some exponentially small . We first give some intuition behind this quite involved
reduction in Section 4.1. Details of the reduction and the proof of its correctness are then presented
in Section 4.2 and 4.3, respectively, with a key technical lemma proved in Section 5. We finish the
proof of the hardness part in Section 4.4 by showing that any approximate Nash equilibrium of an
anonymous game can be converted into a well-supported equilibrium efficiently (since Theorem 1
is concerned with approximate Nash equilibria).
4.1 Overview of the Reduction
Given as input a polymatrix game specified by a matrix A ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n, our goal is to construct in
polynomial time an anonymous game GA, and show that every -well-supported Nash equilibrium of
GA, where  = 1/2n6 , can be used to recover a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A in polynomial
time. Note that this is not exactly the PPAD-hardness result as claimed in Theorem 1 but we will
fill in the gap in Section 4.4 with some standard arguments.
Given A, we construct GA by perturbing payoff functions of the Generalized Radix game G∗n,N
with N = 2n, so that GA is ξ-close to G∗n,N for some exponentially small ξ > 0 to be specified later.
(Thus, GA has the same set of n+2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q,R} as well as the same set of 7 strategies
{s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2} as G∗n,N .) By Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 we know that every -well-supported
equilibrium of GA can be fully described by a tuple X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) that satisfies
xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δi (7)
for each i ∈ [n], where δ = 1/N = 1/2n.
Our construction of GA has player P` simulate row 2`− 1 and 2` of the polymatrix game A for
each ` ∈ [n]. The goal is to show at the end that, after normalizing (x`,1, x`,2), i.e., probabilities of
P` playing s1, s2 in an -well-supported equilibrium X of GA, into a distribution (y2`−1, y2`):
y2`−1 =
x`,1
x`,1 + x`,2
and y2` =
x`,2
x`,1 + x`,2
, (8)
we get a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium y = (y1, . . . , y2n) of A. By (7) we have
y2`−1 ≈ N ` · x`,1 and y2` ≈ N ` · x`,2.
For player P` to simulate row 2`− 1 and 2` of the polymatrix game A, we perturb the original
payoff function payoff∗` of P` in G∗n,N in a way such that the following two linear forms of y:
A2`−1 · y =
∑
j /∈{2`−1,2`}
A2`−1,j · yj and A2` · y =
∑
j /∈{2`−1,2`}
A2`,j · yj
appear as additive terms in the expected payoffs u`(s1,X ) and u`(s2,X ) of P` obtained from s1, s2,
respectively. Let u∗` (σ,X ) denote the expected payoff of player P` in the original generalized radix
game G∗n,N for strategies σ ∈ {s1, s2}. Then more specifically, we would like to perturb carefully the
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payoff functions of G∗n,N such that for every ` ∈ [n], the expected payoffs of player P` in an -well-
supported Nash equilibrium X of GA satisfy
u`(s1,X ) ≈ u∗` (s1,X ) + ξ∗ ·A2`−1 · y
≈ u∗` (s1,X ) + ξ∗
∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`−1,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`−1,2j · xj,2
)
(9)
u`(s2,X ) ≈ u∗` (s2,X ) + ξ∗ ·A2` · y
≈ u∗` (s2,X ) + ξ∗
∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`,2j · xj,2
)
(10)
where ξ∗ is a parameter small enough to make sure that the resulting game is ξ-close to G∗n,N .
If one can perturb the payoff functions of players P` in G∗n,N so that (9) and (10) hold for every
-well-supported Nash equilibrium X of GA, then the vector y obtained from X using (8) must be
a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A. To see this, assume for contradiction that
A2`−1 · y > A2` · y + 1/n (11)
but y2` > 0. Using (11), (9), and (10), we have u`(s1,X ) is bigger than u`(s2,X ) by ξ∗/n (assuming
that errors hidden in both (9) and (10) are negligible). As long as our choice of ξ∗ satisfies ξ∗/n > 
we must have x`,2 = 0 and thus, y2` = 0 from (8).
However, perturbing the generalized radix game so that (9) and (10) hold is challenging. While∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`−1,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`−1,2j · xj,2
)
and
∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`,2j · xj,2
)
(12)
are merely two linear forms of (xj,1, xj,2 : j 6= `) from X , they are extremely difficult to obtain due
to the nature of anonymous games: the expected payoff of player P` is
u`(σ,X ) =
∑
k∈K
payoff`(σ,k) · PrX [P`,k], (13)
a linear form of PrX [P`,k], the probability of P` seeing histogram k given X . As each PrX [P`,k] is
a highly complex and symmetric expression of variables in X , it is not clear how one can extract
from (13) the desired linear forms of (12).
This is where the fact that xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δi helps us tremendously. (Recall that this holds as
long as the generalized radix game G∗n,N and GA are ξ-close.) The core of the construction of GA
uses the following key technical lemma which we refer to as the estimation lemma. It shows that
under any mixed strategy profile X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) such that xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δi, there is
indeed a linear form of PrX [P`,k] that gives us a close approximation of xj,1 (or xj,2), j 6= `, and
its coefficients can be computed in polynomial time in n. We delay its proof to Section 5.
Lemma 12 (Estimation Lemma). Let N = 2n and λ = 2−n3. Given ` ∈ [n] and j 6= ` ∈ [n] one
can compute in polynomial time in n vectors B[`,j],C[`,j] of length |K| (indexed by k ∈ K) such that
every mixed strategy profile X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) with xi,1 + xi,2 = δi ± λ for all i satisfies∑
k∈K
B
[`,j]
k · PrX [P`,k] = xj,1 ±O
(
j2δj+1
)
and
∑
k∈K
C
[`,j]
k · PrX [P`,k] = xj,2 ±O
(
j2δj+1
)
.
Moreover, the absolute value of each entry of B[`,j] and C[`,j] is at most Nn
2
.
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With the estimation lemma in hand we can derive linear forms of PrX [P`,k] that are close
approximations of the two linear forms of (xj,1, xj,2 : j 6= `) in (12). We then use the coefficients of
these linear forms of PrX [P`,k] to perturb G∗n,N and wrap up the construction of GA.
4.2 Construction of Anonymous Game GA
Let A ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n denote the input polymatrix game. We need the following parameters:
N = 2n, δ = 1/N = 2−n, λ = 2−n
3
, ξ = 2−n
4
, ξ∗ = 2−n
5
and  = 2−n
6
.
We remark that we do not attempt to optimize the parameters here but rather set them in different
scales to facilitate the analysis later.
Game 3 (Construction of GA). We use the polynomial-time algorithm promised in the Estimation
Lemma to compute B[`,j] and C[`,j], for all ` ∈ [n] and j 6= ` ∈ [n].
Starting with the generalized radix game G∗n,N , we modify payoff functions of players P1, . . . , Pn
as follows (payoff functions of Q and R remain unchanged). Let payoff∗` denote the payoff function
of P` in G∗n,N . Then for each player P` and each histogram k ∈ K, we set
payoff`(s1,k) = payoff
∗
` (s1,k) + ξ
∗∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`−1,2j−1 ·B[`,j]k +A2`−1,2j · C [`,j]k
)
payoff`(s2,k) = payoff
∗
` (s2,k) + ξ
∗∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`,2j−1 ·B[`,j]k +A2`,2j · C [`,j]k
)
,
and keep all other payoffs of P` the same (i.e., payoff`(σ,k) = payoff
∗
` (σ,k) for all σ /∈ {s1, s2}).
A few properties of GA then follow directly from its construction. First, observe that entries of
A lie in [0, 1] and entries of B[`,j] and C[`,j] have absolute values at most Nn
2
= 2n
3
. We have
Property 13. Given A ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n, GA is an anonymous game ξ-close to G∗n,N where ξ = 2−n
4
.
By Lemma 10, an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of GA is fully described by a (2n+2)-tuple
X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]), where Pi plays strategies s1, s2 and t with probabilities xi,1, xi,2 and
1− xi,1 − xi,2, respectively. We also get the following corollary from Lemma 11.
Corollary 14. Every -well-supported equilibrium X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) of GA satisfies
xi,1 + xi,2 = δ
i ± λ, for all i ∈ [n].
Therefore, the conditions of the estimation lemma are met. It follows that
Property 15. Given an -well-supported equilibrium X of GA, the expected payoffs of P` satisfy
u`(s1,X ) = u∗` (s1,X ) + ξ∗
∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`−1,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`−1,2j · xj,2
)±O(n3ξ∗δ) and
u`(s2,X ) = u∗` (s2,X ) + ξ∗
∑
j 6=`
N j
(
A2`,2j−1 · xj,1 +A2`,2j · xj,2
)±O(n3ξ∗δ).
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4.3 Correctness of the Reduction
We are now ready to show that, given an -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of GA, the vector y
derived from X using (8) is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of the polymatrix game A.
Lemma 16. Let X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) be an -well supported Nash equilibrium of GA. Then
the vector y ∈ [0, 1]2n derived from X using (8) is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of A.
Proof. Firstly, note that xi,1 + xi,2 > 0 so y is well defined and satisfies y2i−1 + y2i = 1 for all i.
Assume towards a contradiction that y derived from X using (8) is not a (1/n)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of A, i.e., there is a player ` ∈ [n] such that, without loss of generality,
A2`−1 · y > A2` · y + 1/n (14)
but y2` > 0, which in turn implies that x`,2 > 0.
Since xj,1 + xj,2 = δ
j ± λ, we have
y2j−1 =
xj,1
xj,1 + xj,2
= N jxj,1 ± O(N2jλ) = N jxj,1 ±O (N2nλ).
Similarly we also have y2j = N
jxj,2 ±O (N2nλ). Combining these with Property 15, we have
u`(s1,X ) = u∗` (s1,X ) + ξ∗ ·A2`−1 · y ±
(
O(n3ξ∗δ) +O(nξ∗N2nλ)
)
and
u`(s2,X ) = u∗` (s2,X ) + ξ∗ ·A2` · y ±
(
O(n3ξ∗δ) +O(nξ∗N2nλ)
)
. (15)
By our choices of parameters, nξ∗N2nλ n3ξ∗δ so the former can be absorbed into the latter.
Combining (14) and (15) (as well as the fact that u∗` (s1,X ) = u∗` (s2,X ) because the payoffs of
s1 and s2 are exactly the same in the generalized radix game G∗n,N ), we have
u`(s1,X )− u`(s2,X ) ≥ ξ∗ (A2`−1 · y −A2` · y)−O (n3ξ∗δ) ≥ ξ∗/n−O (n3ξ∗δ) > ,
for sufficiently large n, by our choices of parameters δ, ξ∗ and . It then follows that x`,2 = 0, since
X is assumed to be an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of GA, contradicting with y2` > 0. This
finishes the proof.
4.4 Proof of the Hardness Part of Theorem 1
From our definitions of G∗n,N and GA, it is clear that all payoffs of GA are in [−1, 3]. Using standard
arguments (invariance of Nash equilibria under shifting and scaling), we can easily see that given an
anonymous game G = (n, α, {payoffp}) such that all payoffs are in the interval [a, b], where a, b ∈ R
and a < b, a mixed strategy profile X is an (b− a)-well-supported equilibrium of G if and only if
X is an -well-supported equilibrium of G′ = (n, α, {payoff′p}), where
payoff′p(σ,k) =
payoffp(σ,k)− a
b− a . (16)
The new game G′ now has all payoffs from in [0, 1].
As a result, we can construct G′A from GA in polynomial time such that all payoffs of G′A lie in
[0, 1], and Lemma 16 holds for all (/4)-well-supported Nash equilibria of G′A. It follows that
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Corollary 17. Fix any α ≥ 7. The problem of finding a 2−(n6+2)-well-supported Nash equilibrium
of an anonymous game with α actions and [0, 1] payoffs is PPAD-hard.
This can be further strengthened using a standard padding argument.
Lemma 18. Fix any α ∈ N and a > b > 0. There is a polynomial-time reduction from the problem
of finding a (2−na)-well-supported equilibrium to that of finding a (2−nb)-well-supported equilibrium,
in an anonymous game with α actions and [0, 1] payoffs.
Proof. For convenience, we will refer to the problem of finding a (2−na)-well-supported equilibrium
as problem A and the other as problem B.
Let G = (n, α, {payoffp}) denote an input anonymous game of problem A. We define a new game
padG = (nt, α, {payoff′p}) as follows, where t = a/b > 1 and thus, nt > n. To this end, define a map
φ : Zα → Zα such that φ(k1, . . . , kα) = (k1 − (nt − n), k2, . . . , kα). We then define payoff functions
of players {1, . . . , nt} in padG as follows:
• For each i > n, the payoff function of player i is given by
payoff ′i(σ,k) =
{
1 if σ = 1
0 otherwise
So player i always plays strategy 1 in any -well-supported equilibrium with  < 1.
• The payoff of each player i ∈ [n] is given by
payoff ′i(σ,k) =
{
payoffi(σ, φ(k)) if k1 ≥ nt − n
0 otherwise
Note that in any -well-supported equilibrium with  < 1, the latter case never occurs.
By the definition of padG, it is easy to show that X is an -well-supported equilibrium in padG,
for some  < 1, iff 1) each player i > n plays strategy 1 with probability 1 and 2) the mixed strategy
profile of the first n players in X is an -well-supported equilibrium of G. As a result, a solution to
padG as an input of problem B must be an -approximate equilibrium of G with  = 2−(nt)b = 2−na .
As padG can be constructed from G in polynomial time, this finishes the proof of the lemma.
Combining Corollary 17 and Lemma 18, we have
Corollary 19. Fix any α ≥ 7 and c > 0. The problem of finding a (2−nc)-well-supported Nash equi-
librium in an anonymous game with α actions and [0, 1] payoffs is PPAD-hard.
To prove the hardness part of Theorem 1, we next give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
a well-supported equilibrium from an approximate equilibrium.
Lemma 20 (From Approximate to Well-Supported Nash Equilibria). Let G = (n, α, {payoffp}) be
an anonymous game with payoffs from [0, 1]. Given an 2/(16αn)-approximate Nash equilibrium X
of G, one can compute in polynomial time an -well-supported Nash equilibrium Y of G.
16
Proof. Let X = (xi : i ∈ [n]) be an ′-approximate Nash equilibrium of G, with ′ = 2/(16αn). For
each player i ∈ [n], we have for any mixed strategy x′i,
ui(x
′
i,X−i) ≤ ui(X ) + ′, (17)
where we let ui(x
′
i,X−i) denote the expected payoff of player i when she plays x′i and other players
play X−i. Let σi be a strategy with the highest expected payoff for player i (with respect to X−i):
ui(σi,X ) = max
k∈[α]
ui(k,X ),
and let Ji = {j : ui(σi,X ) ≥ ui(j,X ) + /2}. We then define a mixed strategy yi for player i using
xi, σi and Ji as follows: Set yi,j = 0 for all j ∈ Ji, and set
yi,σi = xi,σi +
∑
j∈Ji
xi,j .
All other entries of yi are the same as xi. As yi increases the expected payoff of player i by at least
(/2) ·
∑
j∈Ji
xi,j ,
we have from (17) that
∑
j∈Ji xi,j ≤ 2′/.
Repeating this for every player i ∈ [n], we obtain a new mixed strategy profile Y (clearly Y can
be computed in polynomial time given X ). We finish the proof of the lemma by showing that Y is
indeed an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G. Below we write ζ = 2′/.
First, by the definition of Y, |xi,j − yi,j | ≤ ζ for all i, j. Thus, for any pure strategy profile s−i,∏
q 6=i
yq,sq ≥
∏
q 6=i
max
{
0, xq,sq − ζ
} ≥∏
q 6=i
xq,sq − ζ ·
∑
q 6=i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
xp,sp and
∏
q 6=i
xq,sq ≥
∏
q 6=i
max
{
0, yq,sq − ζ
} ≥∏
q 6=i
yq,sq − ζ ·
∑
q 6=i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
yp,sp .
Since all payoffs are in [0, 1], we have for any player i ∈ [n] and pure strategy j ∈ [α] that
∣∣ui(j,Y)− ui(j,X )∣∣ ≤ ∑
s−i∈[α]n−1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
q 6=i
yq,sq −
∏
q 6=i
xq,sq
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ζ
∑
s−i
∑
q 6=i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
xp,sp + ζ
∑
s−i
∑
q 6=i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
yp,sp
= ζ
∑
q 6=i
∑
s−i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
xp,sp + ζ
∑
q 6=i
∑
s−i
∏
p/∈{i,q}
yp,sp
≤ αζ
∑
q 6=i
 ∑
sr:r/∈{i,q}
∏
p/∈{i,q}
xp,sp
+ αζ∑
q 6=i
 ∑
sr:r/∈{i,q}
∏
p/∈{i,q}
yp,sp

= 2(n− 1)αζ.
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This implies that for any pure strategies j, k ∈ [α] we have∣∣(ui(j,X )− ui(k,X ))− (ui(j,Y)− ui(k,Y))∣∣ < /2.
Therefore, the new mixed strategy profile Y = (yi : i ∈ [n]) satisfies
ui(j,Y) < ui(k,Y) +  ⇒ ui(j,X ) < ui(k,X ) + /2 ⇒ yi,j = 0
for all i, j and k. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Fix any α ≥ 7 and c > 0. It then follows from Lemma 20 that the problem of finding a (2−nc/2)
well-supported equilibrium in an anonymous game with α actions and [0, 1] payoffs is polynomial-
time reducible to problem (α, c)-Anonymous. As the former problem is PPAD-hard by Corollary
19, (α, c)-Anonymous is PPAD-hard. The finishes the proof of the hardness part of Theorem 1.
5 Proof of the Estimation Lemma
We prove the estimation lemma (Lemma 12) in this section.
Recall that there are n main players P1, . . . , Pn, and they are only interested in three strategies
{s1, s2, t}. For convenience we will refer to s1 as strategy 1, s2 as strategy 2, and t as strategy 3 in
this section. Player Pi plays strategy b ∈ [3] with probability xi,b, and
∑
b xi,b = 1. While xi,b’s are
unknown variables, by the assumption of the lemma we are guaranteed that
xi,1 + xi,2 = δ
i ± λ, where λ = δn2 . (18)
Throughout this section we will fix two distinct integers r, ` ∈ [n], and the goal will be to derive
an approximation of the unknown xr,1 for P` using a linear form of the following probabilities:{
Pr
[
k1 = i, k2 = j
]
: i, j ∈ [0 : n− 1]
}
, where Pr
[
k1 = i, k2 = j
]
=
∑
k∈K
k1=i,k2=j
PrX [P`,k], (19)
and kb denotes the random variable that counts players playing b ∈ [3] other than player P` herself.
We will show that coefficients in the desired linear form can be computed in polynomial time in n.
First we would like to give the reader some intuition for the rest of the section, by showing how
one can get a good estimate of x1,1 and x2,1, assuming ` > 2. We believe this to be useful for more
easily understanding the rest of the section, but the reader should feel free to skip it, if desired.
Estimating x1,1 and x2,1 (Informal). As N = 2
n is large, we have xi,3 ≈ 1 for each i. This gives
Pr
[
k1 = 1, k2 = 0
] ≈ x1,1 + x2,1 + · · ·+ xn,1 = x1,1 ±O(δ2)
as xi,1 ≤ δi + λ. Similarly, Pr
[
k1 = 2, k2 = 0
] ≈ x1,1x2,1 ±O(δ4). Using xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δi, we have
Pr
[
k1 = k2 = 1
] ≈ x1,1(δ2 − x2,1) + x2,1(δ − x1,1)±O(δ4) = δ2x1,1 + δx2,1 − 2x1,1x2,1 ±O(δ4).
Combining all three estimates, we have
N
(
Pr
[
k1 = k2 = 1
]
+ 2 · Pr[k1 = 2, k2 = 0])− δ · Pr[k1 = 1, k2 = 0] ≈ x2,1 ±O(δ3).
Since x2,1 ≤ δ2 + λ, the linear form on the LHS gives us an additive approximation of x2,1.
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We need some notation in order to generalize and formalize this. Let S = [n] \ {`}, the set of
players observed by player P`. Let kb, b ∈ [3], denote the random variable that counts players from
S that play strategy b. We write L = {i ∈ S : i ≤ r} and m = |L|, i.e., L = [r] and m = r if ` > r,
and L = [r] \ {`} and m = r − 1 if ` < r. We start by understanding the following probabilities{
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
: j ∈ [0 : m]
}
.
It will become clear that players from S\L have probabilities too small to significantly affect these
probabilities (so their contribution will just be absorbed into the error term).
For j ∈ [0 : m], let ∆j denote the set of partitions of S into sets of size m− j, j and n− 1−m:
∆j =
{
(S1,S2,S3) : S1,S2,S3 are pairwise disjoint, S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 = S, |S1| = m− j, |S2| = j
}
.
So, by definition, we have
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
∑
(S1,S2,S3)∈∆j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈S2
xi,2
∏
i∈S3
xi,3
 .
By (18) we can write xi,1 + xi,2 = δ
i + λi for some λi with |λi| ≤ λ. We can substitute to get
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
∑
(S1,S2,S3)∈∆j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈S2
(δi + λi − xi,1)
∏
i∈S3
(1− δi − λi)
 . (20)
Next, we split ∆j into two sets ∆
∗
j and ∆
′
j : (S1,S2,S3) ∈ ∆j is in ∆∗j if S1 ∪S2 = L; otherwise,
it is in ∆′j . This splits the sum in (20) into two sums accordingly, one over ∆
∗
j and one over ∆
′
j .
We show in the following lemma that the contribution from the second sum is negligible.
Lemma 21. Given the parameters in (18), we have
∑
(S1,S2,S3)∈∆′j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈S2
(δi + λi − xi,1)
∏
i∈S3
(1− δi − λi)
 = O(δ∏
i∈L
δi
)
.
Proof. Since all terms in the sum are nonnegative, it suffices to show that
∑
(S1,S2,S3)∈∆′j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈S2
(δi + λi − xi,1)
 = O(δ∏
i∈L
δi
)
. (21)
Fix a set T ⊆ S such that |T | = m but T 6= L. We have
∏
i∈T
(δi + λi) =
∏
i∈T
(
xi,1 + (δ
i + λi − xi,1)
)
=
∑
S1⊆T
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈T \S1
(δi + λi − xi,1)
 .
Since every term on the RHS is nonnegative, we have
∑
S1⊆T
|S1|=m−j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈T \S1
(δi + λi − xi,1)
 ≤∏
i∈T
(δi + λi) = (1 + o(1)) ·
∏
i∈T
δi,
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given that λi = δ
n2 in (18). Let h(T ) = ∏i∈T δi. To prove (21), it now suffices to show that∑
T ⊆S
|T |=m,T 6=L
h(T ) = O(δ · h(L)) = O(δ∏
i∈L
δi
)
.
For this purpose, notice that h(T ) ≤ δ · h(L) for any T such that T ⊆ S, |T | = m, but T 6= L.
It is also easy to see that there is at most one T such that h(T ) = δ · h(L). Because every other T
has h(T ) ≤ δ2 · h(L) and the total number of T ’s is at most 2n−1 = N/2, we have∑
T
h(T ) ≤ δ · h(L) + (N/2) · δ2 · h(L) = O(δ · h(L)),
as δ = 1/N . This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Combining (20) and Lemma 21, we have
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
∑
S1⊆L
|S1|=m−j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi + λi − xi,1)
∏
i/∈L
(1− δi − λi)
±O(δ · h(L)).
The next lemma further simplifies this estimate by absorbing all the λi’s into the error term.
Lemma 22. Given the parameters in (18), we have
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
∑
S1∈L
|S1|=m−j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi − xi,1)
∏
i/∈L
(1− δi)
±O(δ · h(L)).
Proof. First the number of S1’s is at most 2n−1 < N . Further, fixing an S1 and multiplying out∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi + λi − xi,1)
∏
i/∈L
(1− δi − λi)
will yield 3j · 3n−1−m ≤ 3n−1 < N2 many terms. The absolute value of each term with at least one
λi must be less than or equal to λ because all factors are less than or equal to 1. There are at most
N2 many such terms, for each S1, and there are at most N different S1’s. Using N3λ δh(L) by
(18), we can absorb all terms with at least one λi into the error term O(δ · h(L)).
Using Lemma 22 and the fact that
∏
i/∈L(1− δi) > 1/2 as δ = 1/2n, we have(∏
i/∈L
(1− δi)
)−1
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
∑
S1⊆L
|S1|=m−j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi − xi,1)
±O(δ · h(L)).
To understand the RHS better, we define a polynomial Pmd for each d ∈ [0 : m] to be
Pmd =
∑
T ⊆L, |T |=d
∏
i∈T
xi,1
∏
i∈L\T
δi
 ,
and prove the following lemma that establishes a connection between them.
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Lemma 23. Given Pmd defined above, we have
∑
S1⊆L
|S1|=m−j
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi − xi,1)
 = j∑
i=0
(−1)i ·
(
m− j + i
m− j
)
· Pmm−j+i (22)
Proof. Note that every monomial that appears on the two sides of (22) has the form
∏
i∈T xi,1 for
some T ⊆ L with |T | = d ≥ m− j. Fix such a T . The coefficient of ∏i∈T xi,1 on RHS of (22) is
(−1)d−m+j ·
(
d
m− j
)
·
∏
i∈L\T
δi.
On the other hand, for an S1 ⊆ L with |S1| = m− j, we have
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈L\S1
(δi − xi,1) =
∑
S′⊆L\S1
∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈S′
(−xi,1)
∏
i∈L\{S1∪S′}
δi
 .
Hence,
∏
i∈T xi,1 occurs exactly once in this sum if and only if S1 ⊆ T , and will take the form∏
i∈S1
xi,1
∏
i∈T \S1
(−xi,1)
∏
i∈L\T
δi = (−1)d−m+j
∏
i∈T
xi,1
∏
i∈L\T
δi.
Further, there are
(
d
m−j
)
many S1 such that S1 ⊆ T and |S1| = m− j. The lemma is proven.
Combining Lemma 22 and 23, we immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary 24. For any j ∈ [0 : m], we have(∏
i/∈L
(1− δi)
)−1
Pr
[
k1 = m− j, k2 = j
]
=
j∑
i=0
(−1)i ·
(
m− j + i
m− j
)
· Pmm−j+i ±O
(
δ · h(L)).
Taking a step back, we have derived a set of linear equations that hold with high precision over
Pr[k1 = m, k2 = 0], . . . ,Pr[k1 = 0, k2 = m] and P
m
m , . . . , P
m
0 . This then allows us to attain a close
approximation for Pm1 , using a linear form of the m probabilities. Note that
Pm1 =
∑
i∈L
xi,1
∏
j∈L\{i}
δj = h(L) ·
∑
i∈L
N i · xi,1 (23)
is a linear form of the xi,1’s, i ∈ L, including xr,1 (recall that r is the largest integer in L). So from
here, it will be straightforward to get an approximation of xr,1.
The next lemma gives us a linear form to approximate Pm1 .
Lemma 25. The m probabilities and Pm1 satisfy(∏
i/∈L
(1− δi)
)−1 m∑
j=1
j · Pr[k1 = j, k2 = m− j] = Pm1 ±O(m2δ · h(L)).
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Proof. By Corollary 24 (and replacing j init by m− j), we see that it suffices to show that
Pm1 =
m∑
j=1
j ·
(
m−j∑
i=0
(−1)i ·
(
j + i
j
)
· Pmj+i
)
. (24)
Consider Pmd for some d ∈ [m]. Pmd appears in the jth term on the RHS of (24) if and only if d ≥ j,
and when this is the case, the coefficient of Pmd is
j · (−1)d−j ·
(
d
j
)
.
So the RHS of (24) is
m∑
d=1
Pmd ·
 d∑
j=1
(−1)d−j · j ·
(
d
j
) .
For d = 1, the coefficient of Pm1 is clearly 1. For d > 1, using j
(
d
j
)
= d
(
d−1
j−1
)
we have
d∑
j=1
(−1)d−j · j ·
(
d
j
)
= d ·
d∑
j=1
(−1)d−j ·
(
d− 1
j − 1
)
= d ·
d−1∑
j=0
(−1)d−j−1
(
d− 1
j
)
= 0.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 25 gives us a linear form to approximate Pm1 . Denote this linear form by Ym. Then for
the special case when L = {r} (so r is the only integer in L), we are done since Pm1 is exactly xr,1,
and we have attained a linear form that approximates xr,1 with error O(m
2δ · h(L)).
Otherwise suppose |L| > 1. We use r′ to denote the largest integer in L other than r and write
L′ = {i ∈ S : i ≤ r′} (|L′| = m− 1). Repeating the same line of proof so far over L′ and m− 1, we
obtain a linear form of Pr[k1 = m−1− j, k2 = j], j ∈ [0 : m−1], denoted by Ym−1, to approximate
Pm−11 =
∑
i∈L′
xi,1
∏
j∈L′\{i}
δj = h(L′) ·
∑
i∈L′
N i · xi,1 (25)
with error O(m2δ · h(L′)). By the definition of Pm1 and Pm−11 in (23) and (25), we have
xr,1 = δ
r
(
Pm1
h(L) −
Pm−11
h(L′)
)
.
As a result, we have obtained a linear form
δr
(
Ym
h(L) −
Ym−1
h(L′)
)
= xr,1 ±O(m2δr+1) (26)
over Pr[k1 = m− j, k2 = j], j ∈ [0 : m] and Pr[k,1 = m− 1− j, k2 = j], j ∈ [0 : m− 1].
Finally, it follows easily from our derivation of Ym and Ym−1 that coefficients of this linear form
can be computed in polynomial time in n, and every coefficient has absolute value at most Nm
2
.
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6 Membership in PPAD
In this section we show that (α, c)-Anonymous is in PPAD for any constants α ∈ N and c > 0, i.e.
the problem of finding an -approximate equilibrium in an anonymous game G = (n, α, {payoffp})
with payoffs from [0, 1] is in PPAD, where  = 1/2n
c
. Below we use size(G) to denote the input size
of an anonymous game G, i.e., length of the binary representation of G. We write size(a) to denote
the length of the binary representation of a rational number a, and let size(a) =
∑
i size(ai) for a
rational vector a (e.g., a rational mixed strategy profile).
Fix constants α ∈ N and c > 0. We show the membership of (α, c)-Anonymous by reducing it
to a “weak-approximation” fixed point problem [EY10] (see [EY10] for the difference between weak
and strong approximations). Given G = (n, α, {payoffp}), we define a map F : ∆ → ∆ (this is the
map commonly used to prove the existence of Nash equilibria, e.g., see [Nas51]), where
∆ =
{
(xi : i ∈ [n]) : xi ∈ Rα+ is a mixed strategy of player i ∈ [n]
}
is the set of all mixed strategy profiles. For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [α], the (i, j)th component of F
Fi,j(X ) = xi,j + max (0, ui(j,X )− ui(X ))
1 +
∑
k∈[α] max (0, ui(k,X )− ui(X ))
, (27)
where X = (xi : i ∈ [n]) ∈ ∆ and xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,α) for each i ∈ [n].
Observe that F is continuous and maps ∆ to itself. We also have
Property 26. The map F defined above is polynomial-time computable: Given a rational X ∈ ∆,
F (X ) is rational and can be computed in polynomial time in size(G) and size(X ).
Proof. This follows from the fact that there is a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm
(see [DP14]) that computes ui(j,X ), given G and X .
We say X ∈ ∆ is an -approximate fixed point of F if ‖F (X )−X‖∞ ≤ . We prove Lemma 27
in Section 6.1, showing that approximate fixed points of F are approximate Nash equilibria of G.
Lemma 27. Given X ∈ ∆ and 0 ≤  ≤ 1, if ‖F (X )−X‖∞ ≤ , then we have ui(j,X ) ≤ ui(X )+ ′
for all players i ∈ [n] and pure strategies j ∈ [α], where ′ = α21/3.
So to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium X of G, it suffices to find an (3/α6)-approximate
fixed point of F . Moreover, we show in Section 6.2 that F is polynomially Lipschitz continuous:
Lemma 28. For all X ,Y ∈ ∆, we have
‖F (X )− F (Y)‖∞ ≤ 10nαn+2 · ‖X − Y‖∞.
Combining Property 26 and Lemma 28, it follows from Proposition 2.2 (Part 2) of [EY10] that
given G and  (in binary), the problem of finding an -approximate fixed point X of F is in PPAD.
The PPAD membership of (α, c)-Anonymous then follows from Lemma 27.
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6.1 Proof of Lemma 27
For convenience, we write maxi,k(X ) = max (0, ui(k,X )− ui(X )) for i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [α].
In the pursuit of a contradiction, assume that there exist a player i ∈ [n] and an action ` ∈ [α]
such that ui(`,X ) > ui(X ) + ′. This, along with the fact that maxi,k(X ) ∈ [0, 1], implies that,
′ <
∑
k∈[α] maxi,k(X ) ≤ α− 1. (28)
We will show that cases xi,` ≤ α1/3 and xi,` > α1/3 both result in the existence of a strategy
j ∈ [α] such that |Fi,j(X )− xi,j | > , contradicting our initial assumption.
Case 1: xi,` ≤ α1/3. Apply (27), (28) and ′ = α21/3 to get
Fi,`(X ) > xi,` + 
′
α
⇒ Fi,`(X )− xi,` > 
′ − (α− 1)xi,`
α
≥ 
′ − (α− 1)α1/3
α
= 1/3 ≥ .
Case 2: xi,` > α
1/3. Let J = {j ∈ [α] : ui(j,X ) ≤ ui(X )}. We must have∑
j∈J xi,j
(
ui(X )− ui(j,X )
) ≥ xi,`(ui(`,X )− ui(X )),
where ui(X )− ui(j,X ) ≤ 1− ′, ui(`,X )− ui(X ) ≥ ′, and xi,` > α1/3. Therefore,∑
j∈J xi,j ≥
α′1/3
1− ′ ,
which implies that there exists some strategy j ∈ J such that xi,j ≥ ′1/3/(1− ′). Apply
(27) and (28) to get Fi,j(X ) < xi,j/(1 + ′), which implies that∣∣Fi,j(X )− xi,j∣∣ > ′xi,j
1 + ′
≥ (
′)21/3
(1− ′)(1 + ′) ≥ α
4 ≥ .
This finishes the proof of Lemma 27.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 28
As X − Y is of length nα, we have ‖X − Y‖1 ≤ nα · ‖X − Y‖∞. Thus, it suffices to show that
‖F (X )− F (Y)‖∞ ≤ 16αn+1‖X − Y‖1.
Fix i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [α]. We have
∣∣Fi,j(X )− Fi,j(Y)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ xi,j + maxi,j(X )1 +∑k∈[α] maxi,k(X ) − yi,j + maxi,j(Y)1 +∑k∈[α] maxi,k(Y)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Multiplying the terms in the RHS to get a common denominator, which is clearly ≥ 1, we get
∣∣Fi,j(X )− Fi,j(Y)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣xi,j − yi,j∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣xi,j ∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(Y)− yi,j
∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(X )
∣∣∣∣∣ (29)
+
∣∣∣max
i,j
(X )−max
i,j
(Y)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣maxi,j (X ) ∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(Y)−max
i,j
(Y)
∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(X )
∣∣∣∣∣.
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To bound |Fi,j(X )−Fi,j(Y)|, we shall use the following simple trick several times in the rest of
the proof. If a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ [0, 1], then we have
|a1a2 − b1b2 | = |(a1 − b1)a2 + b1(a2 − b2)| ≤ |a1 − b1 |+ |a2 − b2 |,
which easily extends to
|a1 · · · an − b1 · · · bn | ≤ |a1 − b1 |+ · · ·+ |an − bn |,
when all the ai’s and bi’s are in [0, 1].
Now we come back to (29). By the definition of maxi,j(X ), we have∣∣∣max
i,j
(X )−max
i,j
(Y)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(ui(j,X )− ui(X ))− (ui(j,Y)− ui(Y))∣∣
≤ ∣∣ui(j,X )− ui(j,Y)∣∣+ ∣∣ui(X )− ui(Y)∣∣.
As X ,Y ∈ ∆ we have xi,j , yi,j ∈ [0, 1]. Since all payoffs of G are in [0, 1], we have ui(j,X ), ui(j,Y),
ui(X ), ui(Y) ∈ [0, 1] for all i, j, which in turn implies that maxi,j(X ),maxi,j(Y) ∈ [0, 1].
Using these properties above, along with the trick, we can conclude∣∣∣∣∣xi,j ∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(Y)− yi,j
∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(X )
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
k∈[α]
∣∣∣xi,j ·max
i,k
(Y)− yi,j ·max
i,k
(X )
∣∣∣
≤
∑
k∈[α]
(
|xi,j − yi,j |+ |ui(k,X )− ui(k,Y)|+ |ui(X )− ui(Y)|
)
.
Similarly, we also have∣∣∣∣∣maxi,j (X ) ∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(Y)−max
i,j
(Y)
∑
k∈[α]
max
i,k
(X )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
k∈[α]
(
|ui(j,X )− ui(j,Y)|+ 2|ui(X )− ui(Y)|+ |ui(k,X )− ui(k,Y)|
)
.
Plugging all these back into (29), we have∣∣Fi,j(X )− Fi,j(Y)∣∣ ≤ (1 + α) · |xi,j − yi,j |+ (1 + 3α) · |ui(X )− ui(Y)|
+ (1 + α) · |ui(j,X )− ui(j,Y)|+ 2 ·
∑
k∈[α]
|ui(k,X )− ui(k,Y)|.
Finally, we bound |ui(k,X )− ui(k,Y)| in terms of ‖X −Y‖1. Let S be the set of pure strategy
profiles. Then, by applying the trick and the fact that all payoffs are in [0, 1], it follows that
|ui(k,X )− ui(k,Y)| ≤
∑
s∈S−i
∣∣∣∣∣∏
q 6=i
xq,sq −
∏
q 6=i
yq,sq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
s∈S−i
∑
q 6=i
|xq,sq − yq,sq | ≤ αn−1‖X − Y‖1
|ui(X )− ui(Y)| ≤
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
q∈[n]
xq,sq −
∏
q∈[n]
yq,sq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
s∈S
∑
q∈[n]
|xq,sq − yq,sq | ≤ αn‖X − Y‖1.
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Applying these inequalities, along with |xi,j − yi,j | ≤ ‖X − Y‖1, we get∣∣Fi,j(X )− Fi,j(Y)∣∣ ≤ 10αn+1 · ‖X − Y‖1.
This finishes the proof Lemma 28.
7 Open Problems
Can the number of strategies be further reduced from seven in our PPAD-hardness result? Specifi-
cally, could we construct an anonymous game similar to the radix game Gn,N , particularly its set of
approximate Nash equilibria after perturbation, but without the four special (auxiliary) pure stra-
tegies {q1, q2, r1, r2}? While we believe this to be possible, constructing such a game can be highly
non-trivial and would require specifying different payoffs for many of the possible outcomes seen by
each player. Accordingly, proving a result similar to Lemma 11 after duplicating the first strategy
would be even more difficult.
However, even the construction of such a game would only reduce the number of strategies used
in the hardness proof down to three (due to the strategy duplication in the generalized radix game
later), leading to the next open question: Is there an FPTAS for two-strategy anonymous games?
As was posited by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, it remains unclear whether a rational two-strategy
anonymous game always has a rational Nash equilibrium. Additionally, in their sequence of paper’s
proving a PTAS for a bounded number of strategies, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou found that the
form of the PrX [p,k] is significantly simpler for two-strategy anonymous games. Correspondingly,
we found that constructing useful gadgets for reductions with just two strategies to be very difficult,
suggesting that an FPTAS for two-strategy anonymous games is certainly a possibility.
Moreover, could there be an FPTAS for anonymous games with any bounded number of pure
strategies? There is no clear way to strengthen our current construction to obtain a PPAD-hardness
result for 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In order for the estimation lemma to hold, we
need xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δi for all i. So even if we set N = 2, ensuring that xi,1 + xi,2 = δi±O(1/poly(n))
would still not be sufficient for the estimation lemma to hold. Accordingly, in order to modify our
construction to get such a hardness result, we would need to construct an anonymous game, which
contains n players with the same properties as the main players in the generalized radix game, but
with the additional property that O(1/poly(n)) shifts in the payoffs would only cause O(1/2poly(n))
shifts in xi,1 + xi,2, which seems incredibly unlikely.
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